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Summary
In October 2010, the Rwandan Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment 
with Special Provisions came into force. As the name suggests, the law 
is applicable to offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with special 
provisions. This article highlights the gaps in that law and suggests ways 
through which those gaps could be eliminated.
1  Introduction
When Rwanda abolished the death penalty for heinous offences, it sub-
stituted it with life imprisonment with special provisions. Article 4 of the 
Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty1 defines life 
imprisonment with special provisions to mean ‘(1) a sentenced person 
is not entitled to any kind of mercy, conditional release or rehabilitation, 
unless he or she has served at least twenty (20) years of imprisonment; 
(2) a sentenced person is kept in prison in an individual cell …’ reserved 
for people convicted of serious crimes such as genocide and crimes 
against humanity. The human rights implications of the sentence of life 
imprisonment with special provisions have been discussed elsewhere 
* LLB (Hons) (Makerere), LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa) (Pretoria), 
LLM (Human Rights Specialising in Reproductive and Sexual Health Rights) (Free 
State), LLD (Western Cape); djmujuzi@gmail.com. I am indebted to the anonymous 
referees for their constructive comments. The usual caveats apply. 
1 Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty 31/2007 of 25 July 2007.
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and will not be repeated here.2 It is precisely because of those human 
rights concerns that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), amongst other reasons, refused to transfer some of the accused 
to stand trial in Rwanda. This would later force the Rwandan govern-
ment to amend its relevant legislation to specifically provide that life 
imprisonment with special provisions shall not be applicable to those 
people transferred from the ICTR to serve their sentences in Rwanda or 
those transferred from the ICTR to stand trial in Rwanda.3 The sentence 
of life imprisonment with special provisions still applies to those con-
victed of heinous crimes by Rwandan courts. In order to presumably 
address the concerns by human rights activists and academics about 
the human implications of life imprisonment with special provisions, in 
October 2010 the Rwandan government enacted a specific law relat-
ing to serving life imprisonment4 that ‘provides for specific modalities 
of enforcement and serving the sentence of life imprisonment with 
special provisions’.5
The purpose of this article is to show the gaps in the October 2010 
law relating to life imprisonment with special provisions as they relate 
to the rights of prisoners and to argue that, in order to cure some of its 
defects, the law should either be amended or should be read in con-
junction with the Law Establishing and Determining the Organisation 
of the National Prison Service.6 Although the Law Relating to Serving 
Life Imprisonment with Special Provisions was enacted pursuant to the 
Law Establishing and Determining the Organisation of the National 
Prison Service,7 it provides under article 15 that ‘[a]ll prior legal provi-
sions inconsistent with this Law are hereby repealed’. Article 15 does 
not expressly repeal the relevant provisions of the Law Establishing 
and Determining the Organisation of the National Prison Service that 
appear to conflict with the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment 
with Special Provisions. The discussion that follows should thus be 
seen against the background that it is possible for one to argue that 
either that the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with Special 
Provisions repealed those provisions of the Law Establishing and Deter-
mining the Organisation of the National Prison Service by invoking the 
later-in-time rule, or that it did not repeal those provisions because it 
does not expressly say so. Before discussing the gaps as they relate to 
2 See JD Mujuzi ‘Issues surrounding life imprisonment after the abolition of the death 
penalty in Rwanda’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 329-338.
3 See JD Mujuzi ‘Steps taken in Rwanda’s efforts to qualify for the transfer of accused 
from the ICTR’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 237-248. 
4 Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with Special Provisions, Law 32/2010 of 
22 September 2010, Special Official Gazette 14 October 2010. 
5 n 4 above, art 1.
6 Law 38/2006 of 25 September 2006 Establishing and Determining the Organisation 
of the National Prisons Service.
7 See Preamble, para 5.
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the rights of the offenders, I will first illustrate the first weakness of the 
Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with Special Provisions.
2  Offences that attract life imprisonment with special 
provisions
Article 2 of the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with Special 
Provisions provides as follows:
Life imprisonment with special provisions shall be applicable to persons 
sentenced for the following inhuman or recidivism crimes: (1) torture result-
ing into death; (2) murder or manslaughter with dehumanising acts on the 
dead body; (3) the crime of genocide and other crimes against humanity; 
(4) child sexual abuse; (5) sexual torture; (6) forming or leading criminal 
gangs.
The above crimes are indeed serious. However, the challenge associated 
with the law is that it does not define what recidivism is.8 Put differ-
ently, it does not give a criterion that should be used by the sentencing 
judge in determining that the offender is a recidivist or not. This leaves 
two important questions unanswered: one, how many such offences 
should a person have committed for him or her to be categorised as 
a recidivist? Two, what should be the time frame between the first 
offence and the second or third offence before someone is considered 
a recidivist? In other words, if a person were convicted of child sexual 
abuse in 2010 and a sentence other than life imprisonment with special 
provisions was imposed, and that same person, 20 years later — in 
2030 — commits the same offence, should that person be considered 
a recidivist? Before someone is punished in terms of article 2, there is 
a need for a definition of recidivism so that sentencing officers have 
a clear understanding of the kind of person they should consider a 
recidivist.
3  Rights of offenders sentenced to life imprisonment 
with special provisions
This section deals with the various rights of offenders that are likely to 
be sentenced in terms of the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment 
with Special Provisions. The author highlights the weaknesses in the 
law as far as they relate to these rights and make recommendations on 
how those weaknesses may be eliminated.
8 For a discussion on the meaning of recidivism, see G Hallevy ‘The recidivist wants to 
be punished: Punishment as an incentive to reoffend’ (2009) 5 The International Jour-
nal of Punishment and Sentencing 120-145. See also MD Maltz Recidivism (1984). 
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3.1  Right to freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment
Article 4 provides that ‘[t]he rights of the sentenced person to life impris-
onment with special provisions under this Law shall be respected all the 
time and the sentenced person shall be protected against any form of 
torture and cruel, inhuman and other degrading treatment’. Although 
Rwanda ratified the United Nations (UN) Convention Against Torture 
(CAT), it is yet to enact legislation giving effect to that treaty. This means 
that torture is not defined under any Rwandan domestic law. Therefore, 
although torture is prohibited under Article 4 of the Law Relating to 
Serving Life Imprisonment with Special Provisions, torture is not defined 
under that law. It is recommended that the relevant authorities (such as 
courts and prison officials) should refer to the definition of torture under 
Article 1 of CAT9 in their definition of torture under article 4 of the Law 
Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with Special Provisions.10 There 
are two reasons for this: One, Rwanda ratified CAT without making any 
reservation or declarative interpretation to article 1 which defines tor-
ture.11 It is thus under a duty to adopt the definition of torture under 
article 1 of CAT verbatim or to adopt a definition of torture that does not 
differ substantially from the one under article 1 of CAT.12 Two, the defi-
9 Art 1 of the CAT defines torture to mean ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing 
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having com-
mitted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.’ For the drafting history of art 1, see 
M Nowak & E McArthur The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A commentary 
(2008) 27-86.
10 In some African countries, such as Uganda and South Africa, where the respective 
states ratified CAT without making reservations on art 1, courts have relied on the 
definition of torture under art 1 although these countries are yet to domesticate CAT. 
See Attorney-General v Susan Kigula & 17 Others (Constitutional Appeal 3 of 2006) 
UGSC 6 (21 January 2009) (Supreme Court of Uganda); S v Mthembu [2008] 4 All SA 
517 (SCA) para 30 (South Africa Supreme Court of Appeal).
11 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, United Nations Treaty Series Vol 1465 85 Ratification 
Status http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed 1 March 2011).
12 The CAT Committee has recommended that ‘[s]erious discrepancies between the 
Convention’s definition [of torture] and that incorporated into domestic law create 
actual or potential loopholes for impunity. In some cases although a similar lan-
guage may be used, its meaning may be qualified by domestic law or by judicial 
interpretation and thus the Committee calls upon each state party to ensure that all 
parts of its government adhere to the definition set forth in the Convention for the 
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nition of torture under CAT is now widely considered to have attained 
the status of customary international law.13
As is the case with torture, the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprison-
ment with Special Provisions does not define the meaning of cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment. These terms are also not defined in 
CAT because ‘[d]uring the drafting of article 16 [of the Convention], it … 
soon became clear that a proper definition of the terms cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment was impossible to achieve’.14 It 
is against that backdrop that the CAT Committee has adopted a case-by-
case analysis to conclude whether or not an individual was subjected 
to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or whether 
state parties have put in place measures to effectively prevent cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.15 It is recommended 
that the Rwandan authorities, especially judges and prison authorities, 
should rely, inter alia, on the jurisprudence of the CAT Committee in 
determining whether the alleged conduct amounts to cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment. Related to the above, CAT prohibits cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This jurisprudence 
is freely available on the internet, so the issue of accessibility does not 
arise. However, article 4 of the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprison-
ment with Special Provisions does not prohibit degrading punishment. 
The drafting history of CAT shows that the drafters of the Conven-
tion appear to have held the view that there is a distinction between 
degrading treatment, on the one hand, and degrading punishment on 
the other.16 This explains why the conjunctive ‘or’ was placed between 
‘treatment’ and ‘punishment’. Jurisprudence emanating from the CAT 
Committee shows that the Committee has in most cases found that a 
person was subjected to inhuman and degrading punishment when 
such a person had been convicted of an offence and that a person was 
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment when such a person 
was in detention illegally or legally awaiting trial.17
Jurisprudence emanating from the Human Rights Committee also 
shows that the Human Rights Committee draws a distinction between 
purpose of defining the obligations of the state. At the same time, the Committee 
recognises that broader domestic definitions also advance the object and purpose 
of this Convention so long as they contain and are applied in accordance with the 
standards of the Convention, at a minimum.’ See CAT Committee General Comment 
2 (implementation of art 2 by state parties) CAT/C/GC/2/CRP 1/Rev 4, 23 November 
2007, para 9. 
13 Prosecutor v Dragolvjub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vokovic Case IT-96-23 and 
IT-96-23/1-A (judgment of 12 June 2002) para 146.
14 Nowak & McArthur (n 9 above) 540.
15 See generally Nowak & McArthur (n 9 above) 540-576.
16 Nowak & McArthur (n 9 above) 539-540. The USSR delegates, during the drafting 
of the definition of ‘torture’ under CAT, argued that ‘… the institution of punish-
ment is legally applicable to persons who have committed an offence’. See Nowak 
& McArthur (n 9 above) 32.
17 Nowak & McArthur (n 9 above) 540-576.
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degrading treatment, on the one hand, and degrading punishment 
on the other. In state reports and in individual communications, the 
Human Rights Committee has in most cases found that a person was 
subjected to inhuman treatment when that person was in detention 
or awaiting trial before his or her conviction and that a person’s right 
not to be subjected to degrading punishment was found to have been 
violated when such a person had been convicted.18 Practice by the CAT 
Committee shows that in most cases the Committee has used the word 
‘punishment’ instead of ‘treatment’ in cases where capital punishment 
and corporal punishment have been discussed.19 The drafting history 
of article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) illustrates that the drafters were clear that ‘the term “treat-
ment” … [was] broader than “punishment”’.20 This is indicative of the 
Committees’ understanding, at least by implication, that treatment 
and punishment are not synonymous.
The above discussion shows that there is room to argue that degrad-
ing treatment is more relevant to those who have not been convicted 
— although even those who have been convicted could be treated in 
a degrading manner which either relates or does not relate to the sen-
tence they are serving. However, inhuman and degrading punishment 
is more relevant to those who have been convicted. The inquiry focuses 
on the nature of the punishment that has been imposed to answer the 
question of whether such punishment is degrading or inhuman. In other 
words, as philosophers have consistently and convincingly argued, 
one of the essential elements of punishment is the fact that it can only 
be imposed on someone who has been found guilty of breaking the 
law.21 Therefore, the word punishment in CAT is not redundant. State 
parties have an obligation not only to prevent degrading treatment, 
but also degrading punishment. Against that background it is argued 
18 M Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2005) 157-
192.
19 Nowak & McArthur (n 9 above) 543-448. See also Nowak (n 18 above) 167-172.
20 Nowak (n 18 above) 159.
21 Hart, eg, was of the view that for any treatment to qualify as punishment, it must have 
the following five elements: (i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant. (iii) It must be for the offence against legal rules. (iii) It must 
be for an actual or supposed offender for his offence. (iv) It must be intentionally 
administered by human beings other than the offender. (v) It must be imposed and 
administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence 
is committed. See HAL Hart Punishment and responsibility: Essays in the philosophy of 
law (1968) 4-5. Pincoffs is of the view that legal punishment is an institution with 
the following three features: (i) There must be a system of threats, officially promul-
gated, that should given legal rules be violated, given consequences regarded as 
unpleasant will be inflicted upon the violator. (ii) The threatened unpleasant con-
sequences must be inflicted only upon persons tried and found guilty of violating 
the rules in question, and only for the violation of those rules. (iii) The trial, finding 
of guilt, and imposition and administration of the unpleasant consequences must 
be by authorised agents of the system promulgating the rules. See EL Pincoffs The 
rationale of legal punishment (1966) 55-56. 
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that article 4 of the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with 
Special Provisions should be read as prohibiting degrading treatment 
and punishment, otherwise it would be in conflict with CAT. In the light 
of the fact that in 2007 the Rwandan Minister of Justice said that those 
sentenced to life imprisonment with special provisions be subjected to 
solitary confinement,22 which is referred to as single cells in the legisla-
tion, the question is whether detaining a person in a single cell for 20 
years, which in practice is the same thing as solitary confinement, does 
not amount to inhuman punishment.23
3.2  Freedom from discrimination
Article 4 also provides that ‘[a]ny form of discrimination against the 
sentenced person based on ethnicity, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political opinion, nationality, social and economic status, birth or any 
other ground is prohibited’. Unlike article 11(2) of the Constitution of 
Rwanda, article 4 of the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment 
with Special Provisions, which is admittedly not exhaustive, leaves 
out some grounds upon which a person may not be discriminated 
against. Article 11(2) of the Constitution provides that ‘[d]iscrimina-
tion of whatever kind based on, inter alia, ethnic origin, tribe, clan, 
colour, sex, region, social origin, religion or faith, opinion, economic 
status, culture, language, social status, physical or mental disability or 
any other form of discrimination is prohibited and punishable by law’. 
Some of the grounds on which a person may not be discriminated 
against that appear in the Constitution but do not expressly appear 
in the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with Special Provi-
sions are culture, region of origin, and physical or mental disability. 
This means that the implementers of the Law Relating to Serving Life 
Imprisonment with Special Provisions will have to read it in conjunc-
tion with article 11(2) of the Constitution so that the grounds that are 
not expressly mentioned in the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprison-
ment with Special Provisions but mentioned in the Constitution are 
22 See F Kimenyi ‘Death penalty: Recidivist to have special imprisonment’ 27 January 
2007 http://allafrica.com/stories/200701250767.html (accessed 30 March 2011).
23 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held that ‘prolonged 
… solitary confinement could be held to be a form of cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing punishment and treatment’. See Zegveld & Another v Eritrea (2003) AHRLR 84 
(ACHPR 2003) para 55. See also Malawi African Association & Others v Mauritania 
(2000) AHRLR 194 (ACHPR 2000) para 124, where the African Commission held that 
holding people in solitary confinement in a manner that deprives them of their right 
to see their family members violates art 18(1) of the African Charter. See also Achutan 
& Another (on behalf of Banda & Others) (2000) AHRLR 143 (ACHPR 1994), where the 
African Commission held that some forms of solitary confinement violate art 5 of the 
African Charter. For a discussion of the UN bodies and the European of Human Rights 
jurisprudence on solitary confinement, see UNVFVT Interpretation of torture in the 
light of the practice and jurisprudence of international bodies http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Interpretation_torture_2011_EN.pdf (accessed 24 March 2011) 
10-12.
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considered to be part of article 4 of the Law Relating to Serving Life 
Imprisonment with Special Provisions.
3.3  Physical exercise and religious beliefs
Article 5 of the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with Special 
Provisions provides for the following as some of the ‘basic needs’ of 
the person sentenced to life imprisonment with special provisions: the 
offender ‘shall be afforded a minimum standard of living to enable him 
or her to maintain a healthy life and personal hygiene’ and the offender 
‘shall be entitled to time to perform physical exercises and act according 
to his or her religious beliefs’. The above are indeed some of the rights 
that any offender is entitled to irrespective of the offence he or she has 
committed. Article 5 is not detailed on how the rights it provides for 
shall be enjoyed, but it provides that ‘[m]odalities for the implementa-
tion [of the above] provisions … shall be determined by internal rules 
and regulations of prisons’. It is possible that such rules and regula-
tions could be drafted in a manner that makes it almost impossible for 
the offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with special provisions to 
enjoy the above rights. It is recommended that in drafting such rules 
and regulations, regard should be had to the spirit of the Constitution, 
which protects the right to freedom of religion and worship, and to 
the internationally-accepted standards such as those laid down in the 
international Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. 
At the time of writing, the author was unable to establish whether such 
regulations or rules had been drafted.
Article 6 of the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with Spe-
cial Provisions provides that a person sentenced to life imprisonment 
with special provisions shall have the right to medical care. Although 
that provision makes it incumbent upon the prison authorities to put 
the necessary measures in place to ensure that that person receives 
medical care, the law does not expressly state that medical care shall be 
at the expense of the state. Although it could be argued that in practice 
the state has a duty to provide free medical care to prisoners,24 for the 
avoidance of doubt it would be better for that to be expressly included 
in the legislation as has been the case in some African countries, such 
24 As is the case in Rwanda, in some African countries such as Uganda and Ghana, the 
laws do not specifically stipulate that a prisoner will be entitled to medical treatment 
at the state’s expense. See sec 35(1)(e) of the Ghanaian Prisons Service Act 1972, 
NRCD 46, which provides that ‘[t]he Director-General shall ensure that a prisoner 
is promptly supplied with the medicines, drugs … or any other things prescribed 
by a medical officer of health as necessary for the health of the prisoner’. Sec 57(f) 
of the Uganda Prisons Act 17 of 2006 provides that ‘… a prisoner is entitled to the 
following … (f) have access to the health services available in the country without 
discrimination of their legal status’.
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as South Africa25 and Malawi.26 This is because, although states know 
or are expected to know that it is their responsibility to provide medical 
care for those in detention, jurisprudence emanating from the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) 
shows that there have been cases where states have failed to do so.27 
It is recommended that article 6 be amended to expressly provide 
that such an offender shall have the right to medical care at the state’s 
expense.
3.4  Right to be visited
Article 7(1) of the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with 
Special Provisions provides that ‘a person serving life imprisonment 
with special provisions may be visited by his or her parents, his or her 
spouse, his or her children and his or her members of the family’. The 
aforementioned provision is conspicuously silent on whether such an 
offender can be visited by his or her friends, who could include reli-
gious leaders. This should be contrasted with article 28(1) of the Law 
Establishing and Determining the Organisation of the National Prison 
Service, which provides that ‘[e]very prisoner has the right to be visited 
by his or her family members and friends’. It is clear that under article 
28(1) of the Law Establishing and Determining the Organisation of the 
National Prison Service, the prisoner has a right to be visited by the 
enumerated groups of people, whereas in terms of article 7(1) of the 
Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with Special Provisions, the 
prisoner ‘may be’ visited by those people. The Law Relating to Serving 
Life Imprisonment with Special Provisions does not explain why a pris-
oner serving life imprisonment with special provisions does not have 
a right to receive visitors and why his or her friends are not included 
in the category of people allowed to visit him or her. One could argue 
25 Sec 35(2)(e) of the South African Constitution provides that ‘[e]veryone who is 
detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right to conditions of deten-
tion that are consistent with human dignity, including … the provision, at state 
expense, of … medical treatment’.
26 Sec 9(3) of the Malawi Prison Bill 2003 provides that ‘[e]very prisoner shall at the 
expense of the state be given adequate medical treatment for potentially life-threat-
ening conditions and care where possible for other medical conditions that are not 
life threatening’. 
27 Eg, in International Pen & Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 212 
(ACHPR 1998), where Mr Ken Saro-Wiwa was denied medical care by the Nigerian 
government while in detention, the African Commission held, amongst other things, 
that ‘the responsibility of the government is heightened in cases where an individual 
is in its custody and therefore someone whose integrity and wellbeing is completely 
dependent on the actions of the authorities. The state has a direct responsibility in 
this case. Despite requests for hospital treatment made by a qualified prison doc-
tor, these were denied to Ken Saro-Wiwa, causing his health to suffer to the point 
where his life was endangered. The government has not denied this allegation in any 
way. This is a violation of article 16 [of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights].’ See para 112. See also Achutan (n 23 above), where the African Commission 
found that the prisoners had been denied adequate medical care (paras 3 & 7). 
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that this is discrimination on the ground of social status, which is pro-
hibited by article 11 of the Constitution. This is because those serving 
life imprisonment with special provisions are grouped in a particular 
status group that does not have the same rights as other prisoners not 
serving life imprisonment with special provisions.
Related to the above is the issue of the offenders serving life impris-
onment with special provisions being visited or not visited by their 
lawyers. Article 7(2) of the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment 
with Special Provisions provides that ‘a person serving life imprison-
ment with special provisions shall have the right of being visited by his 
or /her lawyer during working hours and they shall be allowed to com-
municate orally or in writing in the presence of a prison guard or any 
other competent prison staff’. This provision should be contrasted with 
article 28(3) of the Law Establishing and Determining the Organisation 
of the National Prison Service, which provides that ‘[t]he detainee28 
shall be entitled to the right of being visited by his or her lawyer during 
working hours and they shall be allowed to communicate in speech or 
in writing with no hindrance’. Everyone with an elementary knowledge 
of prison matters knows that one of the greatest hindrances to proper 
communication between an inmate and an outsider, be it a lawyer or 
a relative, is for the inmate to know that the discussion between him or 
her and the outsider is being listened to by the prison authorities. This 
could be through using electronic devices or the physical presence of 
a prison warder. Therefore, a detainee can rightly argue that the pres-
ence of a prison warder could hinder his or her communication with 
his or her lawyer.
An inmate communicating with his or her lawyer in the presence of 
a prison warder not only risks the real danger of reprisals should he or 
she, for example, allege that the prison administration mistreats him or 
her her, but his or her right to communicate with a lawyer confiden-
tially is also violated. Whereas a detainee has the right to communicate 
with his or her lawyer in private, a person serving a sentence of life 
imprisonment with special provisions does not have that right. It could 
also be argued that this is discrimination on the ground of social status 
which is contrary to article 11 of the Constitution. There are three ways 
to cure the defects in article 7 of the Law Relating to Serving Life Impris-
onment with Special Provisions. One, it should be amended to rectify 
the discriminatory issues highlighted above; two, it should be read in 
conjunction with article 28 of the Law Establishing and Determining 
the Organisation of the National Prison Service; or three, its constitu-
tionality should be challenged before a relevant court.
28 ‘Detainee’ is defined in art 3(7) of the Establishing and Determining the Organisa-
tion of the National Prisons Service to mean ‘any person incarcerated in a prison in 
accordance with a legal decision taken by a court but who has not been tried for a 
definitive sentence’. 
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3.5  Right to appeal against corrective measures
Article 13(1) of the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with 
Special Provisions empowers the prison authorities to take corrective 
measures against prisoners serving life imprisonment with special provi-
sions in cases where they have transgressed prison rules or regulations. 
Article 13(2) provides that such corrective measures ‘shall in no way 
degrade the person or jeopardise the fundamental rights guaranteed 
to him or her by this Law’. Article 13(3) provides that the person sen-
tenced ‘to life imprisonment with special provisions or his or her family 
may request the Commissioner-General of National Prisons Service to 
review any disciplinary action taken against him or her in accordance 
with provisions of the internal rules and regulations of prisons’. Article 
13(3) is based on at least one assumption: that the offender or his family 
has access to and is well acquainted with prison rules and regulations. 
Prison rules and regulations are sometimes voluminous and not readily 
available to the prisoner or members of the public unless requested 
from prison authorities, and some of them may not be willing to make 
these available to the prisoners or their family members. Even in cases 
where such rules and regulations are accessible to prisoners and their 
families, they may be reluctant to invoke them to challenge a sentence 
imposed by prison authorities for fear of reprisals against the prisoner. 
It is thus important that article 13 be amended to allow the prisoner’s 
lawyer to act on behalf of the prisoner in challenging such corrective 
measures. It has to be recalled that article 33 of the Law Establishing 
and Determining the Organisation of the National Prison Service allows 
the prisoner, his or her family or his or her lawyer to challenge any 
disciplinary measure imposed against a prisoner before the relevant 
authorities or before a court of law. Article 13 of the Law Relating to 
Serving Life Imprisonment with Special Provisions should be amended 
to also allow the prisoner’s lawyer to challenge a prisoner’s disciplinary 
action not only before the prison authorities, but also before a court 
of law. Otherwise one could strongly argue that prisoners serving life 
imprisonment are being discriminated against.
4  Conclusion
This note has highlighted the challenges likely to be encountered in 
implementing the Rwandan Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment 
with Special Provisions. One should recall that offences that attract the 
sentence of life imprisonment with special provisions are serious and 
should attract serious punishments. However, the fact that they are 
serious offences does not mean that the sentences imposed on those 
convicted of such offences should be contrary to Rwanda’s national 
and international human rights obligations. Put differently, in punish-
ing heinous offences, Rwanda should not turn a blind eye to its national 
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and international human rights obligations. It could be argued that had 
Rwanda not abolished the death penalty, those found guilty of these 
callous offences would have been sentenced to death and therefore, 
with that in mind, life imprisonment with special provisions is a lenient 
sentence compared to the death penalty. In my opinion, this argument 
misses the point that what is in issue here is not whether the sentence 
of life imprisonment with special provisions is more lenient than the 
sentence of death. What is in issue here is whether the sentence of life 
imprisonment with special provisions complies with Rwanda’s national 
and international human rights obligations. As the discussion above 
has shown, the sentence of life imprisonment with special provisions is 
contrary to Rwanda’s national and international human rights obliga-
tions. It is on that basis that it has been suggested that many provisions 
of the Rwandan Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with 
Special Provisions need to be amended to bring them in line with the 
Constitution and Rwanda’s international human rights obligations. In 
cases where those amendments are not possible, it has been suggested 
that, where practicable, the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment 
with Special Provisions should be read in conjunction with the Law 
Establishing and Determining the Organisation of the National Prison 
Service.
Another argument that could be advanced in support of the sen-
tence of life imprisonment with special provisions as it is currently 
provided for in the Law Relating to Serving Life Imprisonment with 
Special Provisions is that it is in the community’s interest for the gov-
ernment to be seen coming up with serious punishments for those 
who commit callous offences, especially in the light of the fact that 
the death penalty has been abolished. Many genocide survivors, and 
understandably so, would expect the government to seriously punish 
those who murdered their relatives and friends. Many of them were 
indeed opposed to the abolition of the death penalty and this could 
explain why the government introduced the sentence of life imprison-
ment with special provisions to convince them that those convicted 
of genocide and crimes against humanity will not be treated lightly 
by the criminal justice system. While addressing a Rwanda-based 
newspaper, The New Times, in January 2007 the Rwandan Minister of 
Justice, Tharcisse Karugarama, reportedly said that those sentenced to 
life imprisonment with special provisions ‘will regret not having been 
hanged’ as they will be subjected to ‘solitary confinement’ and have 
‘less frequent visits’.29 When it comes to the question of punishment, 
there are different factors that have to be taken into consideration, 
such as the interests of the community, the rights of the offenders and 
Rwanda’s duty to comply with its national and international human 
29 See Kimenyi (n 22 above). See also ‘Rwanda death penalty: Recidivist to have 
special imprisonment’ http://www.afrika.no/noop/page.php?p=Detailed/13399.
html&print=1&d=1 (accessed 30 March 2011).
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rights obligations. Therefore, although the government is expected 
to ensure that the punishments that are provided for in the law for 
serious offences answer some of the concerns of its citizens so that 
they do not lose confidence in the criminal justice system and possibly 
start to take the law into their own hands, the government also has to 
ensure that those punishments do not violate its Constitution and its 
international human rights obligations. Therefore, a delicate balance 
has to be drawn to ensure that the punishments provided for serious 
offences meet citizens’ reasonable expectations, but at the same time 
those punishments must fully comply with Rwanda’s Constitution and 
international human rights obligations. Put differently, constitutional 
and international human rights obligations cannot be sacrificed at the 
altar of community’s interest.
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